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Abstract 
Many fish stocks have been exhausted or are currently overexploited. Cooperative management of 
common fish pools may be necessary to sustain stock levels and future harvests. Even when 
countries have differing time preferences, and thus conflicting management objectives, it has been 
proven that cooperation can be set up such that it benefits every country involved. This, however, 
may require higher shares of the harvest for countries with lower discounting factors. A game 
theoretical approach is used to show that hiding time preferences may be a beneficial strategy for 
individual players. This is shown, however, to be detrimental for total welfare. The bioeconomic 
model proposed by Levhari & Mirman (1980), and extended by Breton & Keoula (2014), is used as a 
frame and optimal management strategies are determined. When cooperating, players are given a 
weight. These weights are then used to establish harvesting levels, by maximizing the sum of each 
players weighted utility. Three methods for establishing weights are proposed. This is done in order 
to capture real life situations. Reporting a lower discount factor is proven to be beneficial under 
several scenarios depending on actual time preferences, growth potential of the stock considered 
and how weights are set. A second-best policy is then set up so that a truthful player (the Principal) 
may induce the other player (the Agent) to report truthfully as well. This comes at a cost for the 
Principal in terms of information rent. The second-best arrangement is however often preferred over 
the outcomes associated with i) competition or ii) cooperation with a misreporting Agent. Finally, the 
case where both players are misreporting is examined. It is shown that both players may have 
incentives to report lower discount factors. This may potentially lead to a standard “prisoners’ 
dilemma” situation, where the parties involved would be better off if reporting truthfully. 
  
iv 
 
 
Contents 
Problem statement.................................................................................................................................. 1 
Objectives ................................................................................................................................................ 1 
Literature review ..................................................................................................................................... 2 
Conceptual framework ............................................................................................................................ 3 
Methods and procedure .......................................................................................................................... 6 
Misreporting time preferences ............................................................................................................... 8 
Exogenous weights ............................................................................................................................ 11 
Player 2 proposing weights ............................................................................................................... 13 
Nash bargaining ................................................................................................................................. 14 
Effects of misreporting .......................................................................................................................... 14 
A second-best policy to avoid misreporting .......................................................................................... 21 
Both players misreporting ..................................................................................................................... 25 
Conclusion ............................................................................................................................................. 26 
Appendix ................................................................................................................................................ 29 
Appendix 1. Second derivative of gains from misreporting .............................................................. 29 
Appendix 2. The optimally proposed weight .................................................................................... 29 
Appendix 3. Deriving an optimal report ............................................................................................ 30 
Appendix 4. The optimal weight in a Nash bargaining scenario ....................................................... 31 
References ............................................................................................................................................. 33 
 
  
1 
 
 
Problem statement  
The management of common fish pools is a problematic issue. Without cooperation, the profit 
maximizing behavior of involved parties may lead to an overexploitation of the resource, and in the 
worst case to stock exhaustion. The overuse of the resource may limit future consumption and may 
reduce future social welfare. Historically, several common fish pools have been exhausted all around 
the world.1 Currently many fish species are under the threat of extinction. 
A policy measure to deter exhaustion, which has been both widely studied and used, is the 
introduction of fishing quotas, fixing the total catches for each participating party. Once agreed upon 
a set of quotas, harvest can be held at a sustainable level, allowing the fish stocks to naturally 
replenish. Future harvests can then be sustained at higher levels than in the case of competition 
between countries. 
The main research questions in this thesis are the following: i) under what circumstances do 
countries have incentives to hide their time preferences when bargaining over fishing quotas? and ii) 
how does this affect fish stocks and harvest? 
In order not to exhaust natural resources and allow for future consumption, an understanding of the 
policy of fishing quotas is important. Studying potential strategies and behaviors by participating 
countries increase understanding of observed historical patterns. For policy makers, this may 
facilitate cooperation, which is potentially welfare improving.  
Objectives 
The purpose of this thesis is to contribute to a better understanding of the management of common 
fishing pools. This is done at the presence of information asymmetry and having in mind the 
sustainable use of these natural resources as ultimate goal. 
This thesis will determine whether hiding time preferences in bargaining over fishing quotas can be 
strategically beneficial at an individual country level. 
What will be established is: 
                                                          
1
 A primary example is the cod population that was exhausted in Newfoundland 1992 (Finlaysson, 1994), and 
other examples are plentiful (Cochrane, 2000). 
2 
 
 
- What happens under competition and cooperation when both countries report their actual time 
preferences? 
- What happens when one country optimizes its individual utility by choosing which discount factor 
to report to the other country? 
- Can one country prevent the other from misreporting their time preferences, by designing a 
second-best policy? 
- What are the optimal strategies if both countries have the option to misreport their time 
preferences? 
Literature review 
Studies in the management of common fish pools began in the late 1970’s and early 1980’s (Bailey, 
Sumalia & Lindroos, 2010). Among the first studies, we find the seminal work by Levhari and Mirman 
(1980). The authors use a game theoretical approach to shed light on the economic implications of 
competition in the management of common fish pools. Levhari and Mirman (1980) establish that 
conflicts over fishing rights lead to non-optimal management of common fish pools, where 
competition between countries leads to a lower steady state of the population and hampers future 
harvest as well as social welfare. Using a Cournot-Nash equilibrium framework, the authors derive 
how much each country in a duopoly harvest in a dynamic bioeconomic model. Stock level depends 
on the stock level of the previous period, its natural growth rate and both countries’ harvest. Levhari 
and Mirman (1980) assume that the behavior of each country depends on current fish stock and 
expected harvest of the other country. Taking this and the other country’s harvest into account, the 
authors create reaction functions for both countries. Equilibrium levels of harvests and stock level 
relative to its saturation are established as functions of discount factors and the growth of the 
population. The case of competition is then compared to levels of stock and harvests when the 
countries cooperate and act as a monopoly. It is shown that harvest relative to the stock level is 
higher in the case of competition. The steady state of the stock is lower and so is the steady state 
harvest. 
The model proposed by Levhari and Mirman (1980) has since the 1980’s been widely used and 
extended upon. The bioeconomic model, with a natural growth rate of the resource, has been 
proven to give a realistic presentation of the growth of stocks of different fish species (Bailey, 
Sumalia & Lindroos, 2010). Game theoretical approaches have been applied to investigate 
competition, cooperation and harvesting behavior within the management of common fish pools. 
Coalitions of more than two countries have been studied, increasing the difficulties of cooperation, 
resulting in competition and welfare losses (Bailey, Sumalia & Lindroos, 2010). Cheating the 
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agreements by overfishing has been proven to be economically beneficial, and potential for 
cooperating after cheating is detected is minimal (Björndal & Lindroos, 2014). Cheating has also been 
shown leading to more cheating being the optimal response by the other players (Hannesson, 2007).  
An extension of the model by Levhari and Mirman (1980), central to this thesis, is the allowance of 
players with heterogeneous time preferences. Cooperative management of common fish pools, 
when players have different discount factors was studied by Breton and Keoula (2014). In their 
extension of the model, possible coalitions are established by giving countries different strategical 
weights. The total weighted utility is then maximized by establishing how much each country harvest. 
It is shown that cooperation between countries with heterogeneous time preferences is still possible 
if higher weights are given to more impatient players using lower discount factors. Maximizing the 
sum of weighted utility has been used in various studies to establish harvesting levels of each 
country. Different methods of establishing these weights have been used. For instance, Houba et al. 
(2000) use a bargaining procedure with one country proposing weights and Rettieva (2014) uses the 
Nash bargaining procedure (Nash, 1950). In the Nash bargaining, the product of weighted individual 
gains of cooperation is maximized. 
The cooperative outcomes and general setup of the model studied by Levhari and Mirman (1980) will 
serve as the baseline for this study, where most assumptions and model specifications are the same. 
For instance, the results from the competition will be the outcome in this model if collusion is not 
attained. The result found by Breton and Keoula (2014), that higher weights are needed for more 
impatient players, is central in this thesis. The result leads to the interesting conclusion that hiding 
discount factors can increase bargaining power when choosing harvest levels and can potentially 
serve as a strategy that can increase the utility of single players. This choice of misreporting time 
preferences is mainly what will be further analyzed in this study. As references as to how the 
bargaining procedure may function, the papers written by Houba et al. (2000) and Rettieva (2014) 
will be used. 
Conceptual framework 
In order to investigate whether hiding time preferences may be strategically beneficial, a model will 
be constructed where one player optimizes his utility by choosing which discounting factor to reveal 
to the other player. To find what happens in equilibrium in this stage of the game, we need to know 
what happens in the second stage, where bargaining takes place. This is when the two players 
bargain over strategical weights that in turn will determine harvest levels of each player. If bargaining 
fails, harvesting will be established by competition between the players. It is then necessary to know 
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what happens in competition to find what players gain from cooperation and to find the equilibrium 
of the bargaining stage of the game. In cooperation, the sum of weighted utility of both players will 
be maximized by choosing corresponding levels of harvest, using revealed discount rates. It will first 
be presented what happens in competition. We will then have a look at what happens in cooperation 
with chosen weights, and finally what happens when these strategical weights are manipulated by 
choosing to reveal another discount factor. 
In the model, following Levhari and Mirman (1980), an exponential function of the natural growth of 
the population is used. Stock levels are normalized such as the saturation level is equal to 1 and the 
stock of any given period is denoted by  𝑆𝑡, where: 
0 ≤ 𝑆𝑡 ≤ 1 
The natural growth of the stock follows: 
 𝑆𝑡+1 = 𝑆𝑡
𝛼 ( 1 ) 
   
𝛼 is between 0 and 1, depending on the regeneration rate of the population in question. If 𝛼 is 1, the 
resource is non-renewable, and for lower values of 𝛼, the regeneration rate is higher. Harvest in 
period t is denoted by 𝑥𝑖𝑡, while total harvest is  𝑋𝑡= ∑ 𝑥𝑖𝑡
2
𝑖=1 , where i denotes players, i ϵ (1,2). 
Harvest is restricted by the current stock such that: 
0 ≤ 𝑋𝑡 ≤ 𝑆𝑡 ≤ 1 
The evolution of the stock level thus follows: 
 𝑆𝑡+1 = (𝑆𝑡 − 𝑋𝑡)
𝛼 
 
( 1.1 ) 
and 𝑆𝑡 − 𝑋𝑡 is the residual stock. The time specific utility of each player 𝑢𝑖𝑡 is assumed to be a 
logarithmic function of harvest: 
 𝑢𝑖𝑡 =  𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑥𝑖𝑡 
 
( 2 ) 
Note that as the utility function is logarithmic and 𝑥𝑖𝑡 takes values between 0 and 1, the utility 
associated with the harvest will always be negative. With no loss in terms of interpretation, a lower 
absolute value of the utility is preferred. Players discount future utility with their respective discount 
factors, 𝛿𝑖.  
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Levhari and Mirman (1980) show that, in a setting of two players, both would be better of 
coordinating catches, together acting as a monopoly. This analysis was conducted using homogenous 
discount rates. With heterogeneous discount rates, the players could still theoretically coordinate 
their catches such that combined utility is maximized. This would however lead to catches from the 
more impatient player tending to zero. As stated in Houba et al. (2000) such a maximizing scheme is 
unlikely and politically unfeasible. Instead, Houba et al. (2000) propose a bargaining procedure in 
which catches in cooperation are determined and in Rettieva (2014) weights are established 
maximizing the factor of weighted individual utility gains from cooperation. 
Breton and Keoula (2014) find that whatever discount factors, cooperation can always be profitable 
by choosing appropriate strategical weights. In their model, catches are determined by maximizing 
the total weighted utility of the players involved. The objective function is then: 
 
𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑥 {∑𝛾𝑖𝑉𝑖
𝐶
𝑀
𝑖=1
} 
 
( 3 ) 
where M is the number of players, 𝛾𝑖  is the weight for player i and 𝑉𝑖
𝑐 is the value function for player 
i under cooperation. This value function is the sum of the value from current harvest and discounted 
future harvests. Results from Breton and Keoula (2014) show that this value function is: 
 𝑉𝑖
𝐶(𝛾, 𝛿) = 𝐴𝑖
𝐶(𝛾, 𝛿) + (1 + 𝛽𝑖) log 𝑠, where 
 
( 4 ) 
𝐴𝑖
𝐶(𝛾, 𝛿) = (1 − 𝛿𝑖)
−1(𝑙𝑜𝑔 ℎ𝑖
𝐶 + 𝛽𝑖 log 𝑞
𝐶), 
and 
𝛽𝑖 =
𝛼𝛿𝑖
1 − 𝛼𝛿𝑖
 
ℎ𝑖
𝐶 =
𝛾𝑖
𝐺
1
𝐵 + 1
 
𝑞𝐶 =
𝐵
𝐵 + 1
 
𝐵 =
∑ 𝛾𝑖𝛽𝑖
𝑀
𝑖=1
𝐺
 
𝐺 =∑𝛾𝑖
𝑀
𝑖=1
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The portion of the stock harvested by each player is ℎ𝑖
𝐶  while 𝑞𝐶 is the portion that is not harvested.  
The harvest levels and corresponding value functions are compared to those emerging from 
competition. The competitive outcomes are as follows:  
 𝑉𝑖
𝑁(𝛿) = 𝐴𝑖
𝑁(𝛿) + (1 + 𝛽𝑖) log 𝑠,  ( 5 ) 
where 
𝐴𝑖
𝑁(𝛿) = (1 − 𝛿𝑖)
−1(𝑙𝑜𝑔 ℎ𝑖
𝑁 + 𝛽𝑖 log 𝑞
𝑁), 
and 
ℎ𝑖
𝑁 =
1
𝛽𝑖(𝑏 + 1)
 
𝑞𝑁 =
1
𝑏 + 1
 
𝑏 =∑𝛽𝑖
−1
𝑀
𝑖=1
 
When discount factors differ, a higher weight should be given to more impatient parties in order to 
have all parties involved benefiting from cooperation. 
The conjecture of this thesis is that misreporting time preferences will be economically beneficial for 
more patient players. Since the more patient player has got more to gain from establishing 
cooperation, an impatient player will have more bargaining power. The impatient player will then be 
able to secure a higher share of the total harvest. Reporting a lower discount factor should then 
result in a higher share of the total harvest. However, hiding time preferences, in the case with a 
patient player reporting a lower discount factor, would also result in a higher level of harvest given a 
certain level of population. This means that, a lower discount factors result in lower levels of steady 
state population and lower steady state harvests. This also reduces the utility of the patient player 
and thus dampens or potentially completely counteracts the benefits from hiding actual time 
preferences. 
Methods and procedure 
The methods used in this thesis consist of a game theoretic approach and economic modelling with 
mathematical maximization and minimization. The model is based on a game consisting of three 
stages. The game is solved using backwards induction. The last stage is simply cooperation or 
competition between countries, as established by Levhari and Mirman (1980) and Breton and Keoula 
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(2014). In the second stage, the bargaining stage, weights are decided and attributed to countries. 
These weights then determine the outcomes in the last stage. If no agreement can be reached, 
catches will be determined by the competition between the countries. The first stage presents the 
novel element by which this research contributes to the literature investigating “the great fish war” 
model. In this stage, countries report the time preferences that are going to be used for establishing 
the weights. 
The objective function to be maximized by the misreporting player is the gains from misreporting, 
𝜋𝑚. Compared to the case when the report is truthful, misreporting alters weights and harvesting 
levels. The actual utility when misreporting, however, is derived using the actual discount factor. This 
value, subtracted by the utility derived from a truthful report, is the gains from misreporting. 
Meanwhile, the believed value functions from cooperation should always be kept at least as high as 
the believed outcomes of competition for both players, in order to have cooperation preferred. 
 𝜋𝑚 = 𝑉1
𝐶(𝛾𝑚, 𝛿1) − 𝑉1
𝐶(𝛾, 𝛿1) ( 6 ) 
 
 
 
𝑉𝑖
𝐶(𝛾𝑚, 𝛿𝑖
𝑚) > 𝑉𝑖
𝑁(𝛾𝑚, 𝛿𝑖
𝑚) ( 7 ) 
𝛿𝑖
𝑚 denotes the misreported discount factor and 𝛾𝑚 is the vector of corresponding weights decided 
with the misreported discount factors. Equation 7 enables the misreporting player to obtain a higher 
strategical weight, by having the other player believe that the first would be better of competing, if 
weights are not altered. 
This research will establish whether or not misreporting time preferences is beneficial, and if so, to 
establish if there exist an optimal level of the misreported discount factor. This will likely depend on 
the growth rate, as well as the time preferences of the players. The results will also depend on how 
weights are attributed to the players in the bargaining stage of the game. Analysis will be carried out 
for three different procedures, These are i) one player proposing weights, ii) the Nash bargaining and 
iii) a third party already having decided how the weights are set. 
The method used will give key insights to the purely economic incentives of misreporting time 
preferences in the joint management of a common fish pool. Given some assumptions, it will be 
shown if utility can be improved by not revealing ones actual time preferences. The model is built 
with two players, but could easily be extended to involve several players and can be adapted for real 
life scenarios. The model is built upon a strong foundation of previous research and modeling. The 
extension examined in this thesis should then be analytically tractable. The overfishing and overuse 
of other natural resources call for a change in how resources are managed. Misreporting time 
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preferences in the joint management of fish pools may be both an economically dominant strategy 
and welfare harming. This makes the study socially relevant. As discussed further in the conclusion, 
the problem of misreporting can also be applied to the management of other resources or other 
international issues. As the model is a simplification of the reality, some aspects of the cooperation 
are not taken into account.  The moral unwillingness of countries to misreport time preferences is 
one such aspect. Misreporting may be economically beneficial, but moral or ethical reasons may still 
have players reporting true preferences. Capturing this aspect could be done using a method based 
on interviews with people involved in decision making for harvests and fishing quotas. This would 
however not lead to any quantitative results as shown in this thesis. For this reason, economic 
modelling is used in this thesis. How non-rational behavior affects harvest and stock levels is left as 
an interesting question open for future research. 
People may very well find moral or ethical values in honesty. One may ask if it is unethical to study 
reporting choices or claim that misreporting is an unethical behavior. In this thesis, however, only the 
purely economic aspect of misreporting is discussed. In real life, honest behavior may still occur even 
if there are economic incentives to misreport preferences. One potential shortcoming of the 
model in this thesis is that it is purely theoretical. It can thus be difficult to apply to real life 
scenarios. Best possible attempts are however made to make the model more easily applied. 
How the bargaining procedure transpires can be adjusted and in order to account for non-
identical countries (except for the discount factor), changes in the utility functions could be 
made. Further discussion of applications to real life scenarios can be found in the 
conclusions. 
Misreporting time preferences 
So far, outcomes from cooperation and competition have been presented in the case where both 
players are reporting their true time preferences.  These outcomes were the results of the work by 
Levhari and Mirman (1980) and Breton and Keoula (2014). The first contribution of this thesis to the 
model is the potential for player 1 to misreport time preferences. As the reporting stage of the game 
is introduced, the value function for player 1, when misreporting, becomes the following: 
 𝑉1
𝐶(𝛾𝑚, 𝛿) = 𝐴1
𝐶(𝛾𝑚, 𝛿) + (1 + 𝛽1) log 𝑠, ( 8 ) 
where 
𝐴1
𝐶(𝛾𝑚, 𝛿) = (1 − 𝛿)−1(𝑙𝑜𝑔 ℎ1
𝐶𝑚 + 𝛽1 log 𝑞
𝐶𝑚), 
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and 
𝛽𝑖
𝑚 =
𝛼𝛿𝑖
𝑚
1 − 𝛼𝛿𝑖
𝑚 
ℎ𝑖
𝐶𝑚 =
𝛾𝑖
𝑚
𝐺𝑚
1
𝐵𝑚 + 1
 
𝑞𝐶𝑚 =
𝐵𝑚
𝐵𝑚 + 1
 
𝐵𝑚 =
∑ 𝛾𝑖
𝑚𝛽𝑖
𝑚𝑀
𝑖=1
𝐺𝑚
 
𝐺𝑚 =∑𝛾𝑖
𝑚
𝑀
𝑖=1
 
However, if player 1 is misreporting his time preferences, this value function is not public knowledge. 
The other player will instead believe that the value function of the first player is as follows: 
 𝑉1
𝐶(𝛾𝑚, 𝛿𝑚) = 𝐴1
𝐶(𝛾𝑚, 𝛿𝑚) + (1 + 𝛽1
𝑚) log 𝑠, ( 9 ) 
where 
𝐴1
𝐶(𝛾𝑚, 𝛿𝑚) = (1 − 𝛿𝑚)−1(𝑙𝑜𝑔 ℎ1
𝐶𝑚 + 𝛽1
𝑚 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑞𝐶𝑚) 
This may result in a higher weight in the cooperation for the first player, since player 2 otherwise 
would believe that player 1 would not gain from cooperating. This is creating an incentive for player 
1 to misreport time preferences.  
If no cooperation were to be established, the revealed competitive outcomes would be as follows: 
 𝑉𝑖
𝑁(𝛿𝑚) = 𝐴𝑖
𝑁(𝛿𝑚) + (1 + 𝛽𝑖
𝑚) log 𝑠,  ( 10 ) 
where 
𝐴𝑖
𝑁(𝛿𝑚) = (1 − 𝛿𝑖
𝑚)−1(𝑙𝑜𝑔 ℎ𝑖
𝑁𝑚 + 𝛽𝑖
𝑚 log 𝑞𝑁𝑚), 
and 
ℎ𝑖
𝑁𝑚 =
1
𝛽𝑖
𝑚(𝑏𝑚 + 1)
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𝑞𝑁𝑚 =
1
𝑏𝑚 + 1
 
𝑏𝑚 =∑𝛽𝑖
𝑚−1
𝑀
𝑖=1
 
The cooperative outcomes are always Pareto-efficient compared to outcomes of competition, as 
proved by Breton and Keoula (2014). Hence, competitive outcomes never materialize. They will 
however, serve as threat points for which weights have to be established in such a way that the 
competitive outcomes are never preferred over the cooperative outcomes. 
The gain from misreporting is the value of the cooperating outcome when misreporting, subtracted 
by the cooperating outcome when the report is truthful. The gains from misreporting are: 
 𝜋𝑚 = 𝑉1
𝐶(𝛾𝑚) − 𝑉𝑖
𝐶(𝛾) ( 11 ) 
 
= 𝐴1
𝐶(𝛾𝑚) + (1 + 𝛽1) 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑠) − (𝐴1
𝐶(𝛾) + (1 + 𝛽1) 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑠)) 
= 𝐴1
𝐶(𝛿, 𝛾𝑚) − 𝐴1
𝐶(𝛿, 𝛾) 
 = (1 − 𝛿)−1(𝑙𝑜𝑔 ℎ1
𝐶𝑚 + 𝛽1 log 𝑞
𝐶𝑚 − (𝑙𝑜𝑔 ℎ1
𝐶 + 𝛽𝑖 log 𝑞
𝐶)) ( 11.1 ) 
The optimal report is at the point where the derivative of the gains with respect to 𝛽1
𝑚 (or 𝛿𝑖
𝑚
) is 
zero. The second derivative should be negative. This is not proven but will be visible in figures shown 
in the next section. The misreported discount factor only affects ℎ𝑖
𝐶𝑚 and 𝑞𝐶𝑚. How these variables 
are affected depends on how the weights are affected by the misreporting.  
When looking at the incentives for misreporting, we will see three different scenarios for how the 
weights are established and how the weights are affected by the reported discount factor. First, we 
will see what the optimal reporting is if the weights are exogenous and could for example be set by a 
third party. The report has then no effect on the deciding of weights. This could be the case of an 
authority already having decided how the cooperation is to be managed. In the second case, player 2 
is free to propose weights according to the reported discount factors. Player 1 can then only accept 
or reject the offer. If rejected, competitive outcomes would materialize. The weights are thus 
endogenous and are affected by the reported discount factors. A real world example where such a 
setup could exist would be when a collusion of countries, acting as one player, is considering 
including an additional country to the collusion, and proposes to this country how the quotas would 
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be set. This method of deciding the weights will later be used for a second-best policy designed by 
one of the players, in order to keep the other truthful. In the last case, the two players bargain over 
the weights using the Nash Bargaining Procedure (Nash, 1950). In this case as well, the weights are 
endogenous and affected by the misreported discount factor. Out of the three, this procedure is 
likely to be the most realistic when two players are considering the joint management instead of 
competition. When allowing for misreports by both players, the Nash bargaining will be used to 
establish weights. This choice is to keep both players having the same bargaining power. 
It is important to highlight the difference between weights and quotas. The weights indicate which 
player is prioritized when the collision is maximizing the combined utility of participating countries. 
The quotas, or simply the harvest levels, result from the established weights, but are also affected by 
the discount factors.  
Exogenous weights 
When misreporting does not affect weights, the derivative of the gains from misreporting with 
respect to 𝛽𝑖
𝑚
 is:   
 𝛿𝜋𝑚
𝛿𝛽1
𝑚 = (1 − 𝛿)
−1 (
𝛽1𝛾1(𝛾1 + 1)
(𝛾1𝛽1
𝑚 + 𝛽2)(𝛾1𝛽1
𝑚 + 𝛾1 + 𝛽2 + 1)
−
𝛾1
(𝛾1𝛽1
𝑚 + 𝛾1 + 𝛽2 + 1)
) 
( 12 ) 
Here, 𝛾2is normalized to 1, such that the interpretation of 𝛾1 is the relative weight for player 1, 
compared to the weight of player 2. The 2nd derivative is negative and can be found in appendix 1. 
The derivative with respect to 𝛽𝑖
𝑚 is used, for the sake of simplicity but at no loss in terms of 
interpretation, as a proxy for the discount factor and is also in line with the works of Breton and 
Keoula (2014). As 𝛿𝑖
𝑚 increases, so does 𝛽𝑖
𝑚.  
Proposition 1.   - When the weights are exogenously given, the optimally reported  𝛽1
𝑚 is: 
 
𝛽1
𝑚 = 𝛽1 +
𝛽1 − 𝛽2
𝛾1
 
( 13 ) 
 - Or, if rearranged in terms of discount factors: 
 
𝛿1
𝑚 = 𝛿1 +
𝛿1 − 𝛿2
𝛾1
 
( 13.1 ) 
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Proof: Maximizing the gains of misreporting (equation 12) gives: 
 𝛽1𝛾1(𝛾1 + 1)
(𝛾1𝛽1
𝑚 + 𝛽2)(𝛾1𝛽1
𝑚 + 𝛾1 + 𝛽2 + 1)
=
𝛾1
(𝛾1𝛽1
𝑚 + 𝛾1 + 𝛽2 + 1)
 
( 14 ) 
𝛽1𝛾1(𝛾1 + 1) = 𝛾1(𝛾1𝛽1
𝑚 + 𝛽2) 
𝛽1𝛾1 + 𝛽1 = 𝛾1𝛽1
𝑚 + 𝛽2 
𝛽1
𝑚 = 𝛽1 +
𝛽1 − 𝛽2
𝛾1
 
Expressing the result in terms of discount factors instead of  𝛽1
𝑚, this is: 
 
𝛼𝛿1
𝑚
1 − 𝛼𝛿1
𝑚 =
𝛼𝛿1
1 − 𝛼𝛿1
+
𝛼𝛿1
1 − 𝛼𝛿1
−
𝛼𝛿2
1 − 𝛼𝛿2
𝛾1
 
( 15 ) 
𝛼
𝛿1
𝑚
1 − 𝛼𝛿1
𝑚 = 𝛼 (
𝛿1
1 − 𝛼𝛿1
+
𝛿1
1 − 𝛼𝛿1
−
𝛿2
1 − 𝛼𝛿2
𝛾1
) 
1 − 𝛼𝛿1
𝑚
𝛿1
𝑚 =
1 − 𝛼𝛿1
𝛿1
+
𝛾1(1 − 𝛼𝛿1)
𝛿1
−
𝛾1(1 − 𝛼𝛿2)
𝛿2
 
1
𝛿1
𝑚 − 𝛼 =
1
𝛿1
− 𝛼 +
𝛾1
𝛿1
− 𝛾1𝛼 −
𝛾1
𝛿2
+ 𝛾1𝛼 
𝛿1
𝑚 = 𝛿1 +
𝛿1 − 𝛿2
𝛾1
 
The result is thus not dependent on the level of growth in the resource when the weights are 
exogenously given. When 𝛿1 is equal to 𝛿2, the optimal level of reported 𝛿1
𝑚 is equal to the actual 
value. When 𝛿1> 𝛿2, the optimal reported 𝛿1
𝑚 is higher than the actual 𝛿1, and when 𝛿2 > 𝛿1, the 
optimal 𝛿1
𝑚 is lower than the actual 𝛿1. In other words, 𝛿2 has a negative effect on the optimally 
reported 𝛿1
𝑚 . The higher is 𝛿2, the lower will be the optimal 𝛿1
𝑚. 
In addition, in order for this solution to be optimal, it not only has to maximize the gains for player 1 
from misreporting, but also has to keep player 2 believing to be at least not worse off than under 
competition. This is: 
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  𝑉2
𝐶(𝛾, 𝛿𝑚) ≥ 𝑉2
𝑁(𝛿𝑚) ( 16 ) 
Player 2 proposing weights 
When allowing player 2 to set the weights according to reported preferences, weights will be set 
such that cooperating and competing result in what player 2 believes to give equal values for player 
1. This is when: 
 𝑉1
𝐶(𝛾𝑚, 𝛿𝑚) = 𝑉1
𝑁(𝛿𝑖
𝑚) ( 17 ) 
The derivation of the optimally proposed weight is shown in appendix 2. This is: 
 
𝛾1
𝑚 = (𝑞𝑁𝑚 +
𝑞𝑁𝑚(𝛾1
𝑚 + 1)
(𝛾1𝑚𝛽1
𝑚 + 𝛽2)
)
𝛽1
𝑚
ℎ1
𝑁𝑚(𝛾1
𝑚𝛽
1
𝑚 + 𝛽2 + 𝛾1
𝑚 + 1) 
( 18 ) 
When the weights change as the discount factors and 𝛽 change, the derivative of the gains from 
misreporting with respect to  𝛽1 also change. This is now: 
 𝛿𝜋𝑚
𝛿𝛽1
𝑚 = (1 − 𝛿)
−1 [(
𝛿 𝑙𝑜𝑔 ℎ1
𝐶𝑚
𝛿𝛽1
𝑚 +
𝛿 𝑙𝑜𝑔 ℎ1
𝐶𝑚
𝛿𝛾𝑚
𝛿𝛾𝑚
𝛿𝛽1
𝑚) + 𝛽1 (
𝛿 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑞𝐶𝑚
𝛿𝛽1
𝑚 +
𝛿 𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑞𝐶𝑚
𝛿𝛾𝑚
𝛿𝛾𝑚
𝛿𝛽1
𝑚)] 
( 19 ) 
 
Player 1 will be maximizing the gains from misreporting, 𝜋𝑚, by choosing to report the discount 
factor and thus 𝛽1
𝑚 that yields the highest utility. This is done also keeping weights such that player 
1 is at least not worse off cooperating compared to competing, and player 2 believes he is at least 
not worse off cooperating than competing. Algebraically, this is: 
 Maxβ1m: 𝜋
𝑚 = 𝑉1
𝐶(𝛾𝑚) − 𝑉𝑖
𝐶(𝛾) ( 20 ) 
 
Subject to: 
   𝑉1
𝐶(𝛾𝑚, 𝛿) ≥ 𝑉1
𝑁(𝛿) ( 21 ) 
and 
  𝑉2
𝐶(𝛾𝑚, 𝛿𝑚) ≥ 𝑉2
𝑁(𝛿𝑚) ( 22 ) 
 
Further derivation of the optimal 𝛽1
𝑚 is found in appendix 3, but software using these objective 
functions is used to simulate results, shown in the next section. 
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Nash bargaining 
Using instead the Nash bargaining solution, as in Rettieva (2013), weights are set by maximizing the 
product of believed gains from cooperation for each player. 
 
 𝑀𝑎𝑥𝛾  𝛱
𝐶𝑚 = [𝑉1
𝐶(𝛾𝑚, 𝛿𝑚) − 𝑉1
𝑁(𝛿𝑖
𝑚)][𝑉2
𝐶(𝛾𝑚, 𝛿𝑚) − 𝑉2
𝑁( 𝛿𝑖
𝑚)] ( 23 ) 
= [𝐴1
𝐶(𝛾𝑚, 𝛿𝑚) − 𝐴1
𝑁( 𝛿𝑚)][𝐴2
𝐶(𝛾𝑚, 𝛿𝑚) − 𝐴2
𝑁( 𝛿𝑚)] 
= [(1 − 𝛿1
𝑚)−1(𝑙𝑜𝑔 ℎ1
𝐶𝑚 + 𝛽1
𝑚 log 𝑞𝐶𝑚)
− (1 − 𝛿1
𝑚)−1(𝑙𝑜𝑔 ℎ1
𝑁𝑚 + 𝛽1
𝑚 log 𝑞𝑁𝑚)][(1 − 𝛿2
𝑚)−1(𝑙𝑜𝑔 ℎ2
𝐶𝑚 + 𝛽2
𝑚 log 𝑞𝐶𝑚)
− (1 − 𝛿2
𝑚)−1(𝑙𝑜𝑔 ℎ2
𝑁𝑚 + 𝛽2
𝑚 log 𝑞𝑁𝑚)] 
The previous constraints, i.e. equations (21) and (22), must also hold here. Again, results are shown 
using software and further derivation of weights and optimal reports are found in appendix 3. 
Effects of misreporting 
First, the various effects of misreporting the discount factor will be shown.  The optimal strategy of 
player 1 will then be found showing the gains from misreporting different values of the discount 
factor. This will be done with different combinations of actual discount factors, growth of the fish 
stock and how the weights are decided. When showing the numerical results, the true discount 
factors will be either 0.99 or 0.8, and reported values of the discount factor range from 0.99 to 0.5. A 
player with a discount factor of 0.99 is referred to as patient and a player with a discount factor of 
0.8 is referred to as an impatient player. No moral standpoint is taken as differing discount factor 
only present differing objectives of the management of the resource. 
In both cases when misreporting affects the weights, harvest levels are affected in two ways. Firstly, 
a lower reported discount factor results in a cooperation with a higher combined level of ∑ ℎ𝑖
𝐶𝑚𝑛
𝑖=1 , 
which is a larger proportion of the stock harvested each year. Secondly, misreporting the discount 
factor also affect the individual harvesting shares, in such a way that a lower reported discount factor 
results in a higher share of the harvest. For the case of exogenous weights, only the first effect is 
present. 
A graphical illustration of the effects of misreporting is shown in figure 1. Player 1 reporting a lower 
discount factor results in a higher weight and thus a higher share of the harvest. At the same time, 
the part of the stock that is harvested by the coalition is also increased, which decreases the 
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equilibrium level of the stock. This results in lowering the equilibrium harvest for both players. For 
the harvest of player 2, the two effects are negative. The harvest for player 2 is thus strictly 
decreasing as player 1 reports a lower discount factor. For player 1, the two effects are opposing. 
Note also that maximizing utility and maximizing the equilibrium level of harvest is not the same, 
because of the discounting giving more weight to immediate harvest. A higher level of ℎ1 than that 
which maximizes equilibrium harvest is then desired.  
 
Figure 1. Effects of misreporting discount factor. (Nash bargaining, 𝜶=0.7; 𝜹𝟏=𝜹𝟐=0.8) 
 
From figure 2, it is clear that for lower values of the reported discount factor, the weight for player 1 
is higher. The effects on the utility of player 2 are positively related with the reported discount factor 
of player 1. The effect on player 1’s own utility is negatively related to the reported discount factor. 
Reporting a lower discount factor yields a higher utility. 
0,00
0,10
0,20
0,30
0,40
0,50
0,5 0,6 0,7 0,8 0,9 1
Reported discount factor by player 1 
Effects of misreporting 
Harvest 1
Harvest 2
H1
H2
STOCK
16 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Utility effects of misreporting. (Nash bargaining, 𝜶=0.7; 𝜹𝟏=𝜹𝟐=0.8) 
For different combinations of true discount factors and growth rates of the stock, the utility gains of 
player 1 are shown in figures 3 through 10. The first four figures illustrate results from Nash 
bargaining while the last four illustrate results from the scenario where player 2 proposes the 
weights. 
 
 
Figure 3. Gains from misreported levels of the discount factor. (Nash bargaining, 𝜹𝟏=0.99, 𝜹𝟐=0.99) 
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Figure 4. Gains from misreported levels of the discount factor. (Nash bargaining, 𝜹𝟏=0.99, 𝜹𝟐=0.8)
2
 
 
 
Figure 5. Gains from misreported levels of the discount factor. (Nash bargaining,  d1=0.8, d2=0.99) 
 
                                                          
2
 When 𝜶 is 1, the gain from the optimal report is around 450. A graph with expanded y-axis can be found in 
the appendix. 
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Figure 6. Gains from misreported levels of the discount factor. Nash bargaining,  d1=0.8, d2=0.8 
The benefits of misreporting time preferences are concave in the reported discount factor. There 
exists an optimally reported factor, and this is in most cases below the actual value. It is only non-
beneficial to misreport the discount factor when the resource has low growth potential. For 
misreporting not to be beneficial, both countries have to be relatively patient as well, using high 
actual discount factors. In all of figures 3 through 6, when α increases, the optimally reported 
discount factor increases as well. If there is less growth in the resource, reporting closer to the actual 
discount factor is optimal. 
Comparing figure 3 and 4, or 5 and 6, we can also tell that when the discount factor of player 2 is 
higher, player 1 will misreport closer to the actual value. By comparing figure 3 and 5, or 4 and 6, we 
can conclude that when the discount factor of player 1 is higher, the misreport will again be closer to 
the actual value. 
Graphs 7 to 10 show gains from misreported levels of the discount factor when player 2 is deciding 
how to allocate the weights. The shapes and trends are the same as with bargaining, with the 
difference that optimally reported discount factor is slightly pushed further away from the true value 
in the case where player 2 decides weights. 
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Figure 7. Gains from misreported levels of the discount factor. (Player 2 deciding weights, d1=0.99, d2=0.99) 
  
Figure 8. Gains from misreported levels of the discount factor. (Player 2 deciding weights,  d1=0.99 , d2=0.8)
3 
 
                                                          
3
 As before, when 𝜶 is 1, the gain from the optimal report is around 530. A graph with expanded y-axis can be 
found in appendix 5. 
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Figure 9. Gains from misreported levels of the discount factor. (Player 2 deciding weights, d1=0.8 , d2=0.99) 
 
 
Figure 10. Gains from misreported levels of the discount factor. (Player 2 deciding weights,  d1=0.8 , d2=0.8) 
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A second-best policy to avoid misreporting 
In order to deter misreporting by player 1, player 2 may design a second best policy. Imagine an 
incumbent country or collusion of countries already managing a fish pool. At the presence of a new 
entrant contemplating harvesting the resource, the incumbent party may propose to the entrant 
how the management is to be set up and how the harvest is divided. In the case of large scale fishing 
in international waters, this would not be an unlikely situation. The time preferences, and thus 
management objectives, of the entrant could be unknown whilst an incumbent player has already 
revealed time preferences with past management of the resource. The information asymmetry could 
be further justified by having one player being a country with a stable economy, where for instance 
economic growth is expected to be steady. The management objectives, or time preferences, of such 
a country would likely be publicly known. Meanwhile, if the other player is a country where the state 
of the economy is volatile and/or characterized by relevant but hardly assessable political risks, the 
actual time preferences of this country would not be public knowledge. Some level of misreporting 
would then be possible. 
The second-best policy should ensure both cooperation and truthful reports. In this section, such a 
policy is examined in a Stackelberg frame where player 2 leads and proposes a weight to player 1. 
Player 1 will then accept this deal or reject it, resulting in competitive outcomes. For the sake of 
simplicity but at no loss in terms of intuition, the analysis will be developed in a two-type frame. A 
description of the model as well as notes on the continuous frame can be found in Laffont and 
Martimort (2002). The players may either be patient, using 𝛿 as discount factor, or impatient, using 
δ. The weights will be set by player 2, who will, in the following, be referred to as the Principal, after 
the report given by player 1, who is referred to as the Agent. The Agent may report being either of 
type 𝛿 or δ. 
If there is no information asymmetry, weights will be set such that the utility of cooperation and 
competition are the same for the Agent. This should be done in order to secure that cooperation is 
achieved at the lowest cost for the Principal. When the type of the Agent is private information, 
however, the Principal has to offer a menu of weights that ensures that the Agent will reveal his true 
discount factor, and also prefer cooperation over competition. These requirements can be met by 
imposing two constraints for each possible type of player. The incentive compatibility constraints 
ensure that each type of player prefers revealing their true time preferences over misreporting. This 
is: 
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 𝑉1
𝐶(𝛿, 𝛾1𝑆𝐵) > 𝑉1
𝐶 (𝛿, 𝛾1𝑆𝐵) ( 24 ) 
and 
 𝑉1
𝐶 (𝛿, 𝛾1𝑆𝐵) > 𝑉1
𝐶(𝛿, 𝛾1𝑆𝐵) ( 25 ) 
The discount factor in parenthesis represents the true value and the gamma is the established 
weight, based on the report given by the Agent. Subscript SB is for the second-best policy. 
The individual rationality constraints ensure that each type of player also prefers cooperation under 
the proposed contract over competition. This is: 
 𝑉1
𝐶(𝛿, 𝛾1𝑆𝐵) > 𝑉1
𝑁(𝛿) ( 26 ) 
and 
 𝑉1
𝐶 (𝛿, 𝛾1𝑆𝐵) > 𝑉1
𝑁(𝛿) ( 27 ) 
As long as cooperating is preferred over competition, the Principal will maximize his utility by 
proposing the lowest weights for the Agent that still meet these constraints. The maximized 
expected utility of the Principal is: 
 max
𝛾1𝑆𝐵,𝛾1𝑆𝐵
𝑃 ∗ 𝑉2
𝐶(𝛿, 𝛾1𝑆𝐵) + (1 − 𝑃) ∗ 𝑉2
𝐶 (𝛿, 𝛾1𝑆𝐵) ( 28 ) 
P is the probability that the Agent is of type 𝛿. The true discount factor of the Agent is unknown to 
the Principal, but the probability distribution, and thus P, is known.  
Since a player of type 𝛿 may have incentives to report 𝛿, the weight proposed for a report of 𝛿 may 
have to be higher in the second-best policy than in the first-best scenario. The difference between 
first-best and second-best weights is the informational rent. 
All of the constraints will not be binding at the optimum. The problem of asymmetric information 
lays in that a patient player may report being more impatient. This type of player must then be given 
an information rent in order to stay truthful, whereas the impatient player only needs to be given a 
weight such that competition is not preferred. Hence, we must have the equalities: 
 𝑉1
𝐶(𝛿, 𝛾1𝑆𝐵) = 𝑉1
𝐶 (𝛿, 𝛾1𝑆𝐵) ( 29 ) 
and 
 𝑉1
𝐶 (𝛿, 𝛾1𝑆𝐵) = 𝑉1
𝑁(𝛿) ( 30 ) 
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The second restriction (equation 25) will not be binding since it is only beneficial to misreport a lower 
discount factor. The third restriction is likely not binding either, since 𝛾1𝑆𝐵 will have to be increased 
compared to 𝛾1𝐹𝐵 due to the first restriction.  The problematic restriction for the Principal is the first 
one, and the difference 𝑉1
𝐶 (𝛿, 𝛾1𝐹𝐵) − 𝑉1
𝐶(𝛿, 𝛾1𝐹𝐵) is what must be compensated for in the second-
best policy by giving a higher weight for a report of 𝛿. 
Proposition 2. Under asymmetric information, the optimal set of weights proposed entails: 
- No weight distortion for the impatient type 𝛿, with respect to the first-best solution. An upward 
distortion of the weights for the patient type 𝛿. The distortion observed represents the information 
rent to be paid for securing incentive compatibility. 
- Only the patient type gets a strictly positive utility change, given by:   
 𝑉1
𝐶 (𝛿, 𝛾1𝐹𝐵) − 𝑉1
𝐶(𝛿, 𝛾1𝐹𝐵) ( 31) 
 
Assuming the Principal has the discount factor 𝛿 = 0.99, 𝛿 is 0.8 and α is 0.7, numerical results are as 
follows in table 1. In the table, weights proposed and corresponding utilities are shown for the case 
of no policy and the second-best policy. Values are shown for the two levels of discount factor, with 
the same two possible levels of reported discount factor. The first-best policy weights and values are 
found in the 3rd through 5th row in the columns where reporting is truthful. Bold numbers are the 
values associated with the best response for the Agent. 
Table 1. Results of policies. 𝛿2=0.99, 𝛼=0.7 
𝛿1 0.8 0.99 
𝛿1
𝑚 0.8 0.99 0.8 0.99 
𝛾1 1.602 0.718 1.602 0.718 
𝑉1(𝛿
𝑚, 𝛾) -11.1 -13.4 -254.0 -289.4 
𝑉2(𝛿
𝑚, 𝛾) -301.2 -256.2 -301.2 -256.2 
𝛾1𝑆𝐵 1.602 1.47 1.602 1.47 
𝑉1(𝛿
𝑚, 𝛾
𝑆𝐵
) -11.1 -11.6 -254.0 -254.0 
𝑉2(𝛿
𝑚, 𝛾
𝑆𝐵
) -301.2 -292.5 -301.2 -292.5 
𝑉2
𝑁 -343.6 -289.2 
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If the Agent has a discount factor of 0.8, the weight has to be at least 1.602. Anything lower will 
make competition preferred. If the Agent has a discount factor of 0.99, the weight has to be 0.718 or 
higher. However, an Agent with 0.99 will prefer reporting 0.8 and be given a weight of 1.602, since 
this gives a higher utility (-254.0 compared to -289.4). To avoid this misreporting, the Principal has to 
raise the weight given for a reported discount factor of 0.99 up to 1.47. This makes the Agent 
indifferent between staying honest and misreporting, if the true discount factor is 0.99. If the 
discount factor of the Agent is 0.8, reporting 0.8 is still preferred over reporting 0.99. Using this 
policy, the utility of the Principal will be -301.2 if the Agent has a discount factor of 0.8, and -256.2 if 
the Agent has a discount factor of 0.99. These utilities should also be compared to the competitive 
outcomes. If competing, the Principal will have a utility of -343.6 if the Agent has a discount factor of 
0.8 and -289.2 if the Agent has a discount factor of 0.99. The policy is thus working in keeping the 
Agent truthful, without incurring losses for the Principal compared to the competitive outcomes. To 
find the informational rent we compare the weights in the first-best scenario with those in the 
second-best. In the case of an impatient Agent (𝛿2 = 0.8), the weights are the same and there is no 
informational rent. For the patient Agent (𝛿2 = 0.99) the first best weight is 0.718 and the second 
best weight is 1.47.  The informational rent is then  1.47 − 0.718 = 0.752. 
Results when the Principal instead has a discount factor of 0.8 are shown in table 2 and results when 
the growth potential is limited are shown in table 3, where 𝛼 is changed to 0.9.  
 
Table 2. Results of policies. 𝜹𝟐=0.8, 𝜶=0.7 
𝛿1 0.8 0.,99 
𝛿1
𝑚 0.8 0.99 0.8 0.99 
𝛾1 0.775 0.345 0.775 0.345 
𝑉1(𝛿
𝑚, 𝛾) -12.749 -15.452 -297.017 -343.631 
𝑉2(𝛿
𝑚, 𝛾) -11.474 -10.133 -11.474 -10.133 
𝛾1𝑆𝐵 0.775 0.666 0.775 0.666 
𝑉1(𝛿
𝑚, 𝛾
𝑆𝐵
) -12.749 -13.289 -297.017 -297.017 
𝑉2(𝛿
𝑚, 𝛾
𝑆𝐵
) -11.474 -11.258 -11.474 -11.258 
𝑉2
𝑁 -12.749 -11.124 
 
If the Principal has a discount factor of 0.8, the second-best policy will be beneficial if the Agent has a 
discount factor of 0.8, but the Principal will actually prefer competing if the Agent´s true discount 
factor is 0.99. This is because the weight needed to keep an Agent of type 𝛿 truthful is simply too 
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high for the Principal to benefit from the cooperation. If the Principal is risk neutral and the 
probability distribution of the type of the Agent is uniform, the Principal will still use the second best 
policy, since the expected benefit is positive: 
 𝐸[𝑉2(𝛿
𝑚, 𝛾
𝑆𝐵
) − 𝑉2
𝑁] > 0 ( 32 ) 
 0,5 ∗ [(−11,474) − (−12,749)] + 0,5 ∗ [(−11,258) − (−11,124)] = 0,5705 ( 32.1) 
 
Table 3. Results of policies. 𝜹𝟐=0.99, 𝜶=0.9 
𝛿1 0.8 0.99 
𝛿1
𝑚 0.8 0.99 0.8 0.99 
𝛾1 28.639 0.591 28.639 0.591 
𝑉1(𝛿
𝑚, 𝛾) -14.389 -26.634 -1051.339 -607.643 
𝑉2(𝛿
𝑚, 𝛾) -1386.817 -555.069 -1386.818 -555.069 
𝑉2
𝑁 -1659.611 -607.643 
 
When the growth potential is more limited, with 𝛼=0.9, the second best policy is not needed. The 
Agent already prefers reporting truthfully and both players prefer the proposed cooperative 
management over the competitive outcome. 
The set-up of the second-best policy clearly depends on discount factors, possible levels of reported 
discount factors and the growth potential of the stock. It seems that the second-best policy is more 
worth-while for a patient Principal and it is less beneficial if the Agent is, or has a high probability of 
being, a patient player. Since a lower growth potential of the resource diminish the range of 
beneficial misreported values of the discount factor, a lower growth rate will make the second-best 
policy less likely to be needed. 
In the second-best policy examined, only the Agent has had the misreporting potential. The 
justification was an incumbent Principal, whose time preferences were already revealed by past 
management of the fish stock. Including misreporting potential for the Principal would be an 
interesting addition but will be left aside for possible future studies. A short analysis of having both 
players misreporting, with equal bargaining power, follows in the next section. 
Both players misreporting 
So far, only player 1 has had the potential to misreport time preferences. Now, we shall see the 
outcomes when also giving player 2 the option of misreporting time preferences. The weights will be 
set by the Nash bargaining procedure. Both players are thus equal in every aspect, except they may 
26 
 
 
differ in their true time preferences. In the setup, the players can only choose between a few levels 
of the reported discount factor. Table 4 and 5 show the outcomes in terms of what the players gain 
or lose from misreporting. Bold numbers show best response and optimal report. For the values of 
true discount factors and growth potentials of the stock used, there are individual incentives to 
report the lowest discount factor. This is however damaging for both players when they both have a 
discount factor of 0.9, since they would be better off if both reported the true values. When one 
player is more patient than the other, using discount factors of 0.99 and 0.8, both will have 
incentives to report the lower option, increasing the utility of the patient player but damaging that of 
the more impatient player. At the same time, equilibrium level of the stock is lowered, as a result of 
reporting lower discount factors. 
Table 4. Gains from reported discount factors. Nash bargaining, α=0.7, δ1=δ2=0.9 
  
Player 1 
𝛿𝑖
𝑚 0.8 0.9 0.99 
 
0.8 (-0.27, -0.27) (-2.17, 1.64) (-4.52, 3.08) 
Player 2 0.9 (1.64, -2.17) (0,0) (-2.12, 1.67) 
 
0.99 (3.08, -4.52) (1.67, -2.12) (-0.24, -0.24) 
 
Table 5. Gains from reported discount factors. Nash bargaining, α=0.7, δ1=0.8, δ2=0.99 
 
 Player1    
 
𝛿𝑖
𝑚 0.8 0.99 
Player 2 0.8 (-1.48, 37.42) (-3.8, 75.98) 
 
0.99 (0,0) (-1.92, 49.53) 
Conclusion 
It has been shown that misreporting time preferences can be beneficial for individual players in the 
management of a common fish pool. Optimal reporting is affected by the discount factors of each 
player. A higher factor for any player results in an optimal report closer to the actual factor. A higher 
α, which is a lower regeneration rate of the resource, also leads to the optimal report being closer to 
the actual value. How the weights are decided in the collusion also affect optimal reporting, but the 
general shapes and trends are the same as long as misreporting affects the weights. When weights 
are exogenous, reporting a discount factor in the opposing direction compared to the discount factor 
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of the other player is the optimal behavior. When reporting a lower discount factor, which is the only 
beneficial misreport in the case of endogenous weights, equilibrium level of the stock is lowered and 
so is the equilibrium level of harvest. This is then damaging the social welfare. In order to avoid 
misreporting, one of the players may design a second-best policy. This has been shown to possibly 
increase the utility of the truthful player, but is not always guaranteed to work in keeping the other 
player truthful at the same time as keeping cooperation preferred over competition. When both 
players have the potential to misreport their time preferences, a prisoners’ dilemma can evolve and 
both players report a lower discount factor, damaging equilibrium stock levels, harvests and utility 
for both players. 
Hiding time preferences may not only impact the performance of a cooperative agreement in terms 
of levels of harvest, but may also make cooperating less beneficial. This may then, by potentially 
hindering cooperation, be a threat for the sustainable management of fish species over. In order to 
secure the future of these species and the welfare accruing through the harvest, understanding 
cooperation is important. Misreporting preferences may, in spite of being detrimental for the 
management of the fish stock and for achieving a socially optimal level of welfare, emerge as a 
dominant strategy for individual Agents.  This is a problem, and understanding the drivers for 
decision making may help reduce the risks of exhausting fish stocks as well as improving welfare. 
In real life, no negotiations are as simple as two players reporting their discount factor with 
outcomes then being decided according to a certain bargaining method. However, countries do differ 
in their management objectives and the discount factor can be used as a proxy for these 
management objectives.  
In 1994, members of the North-west Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO) decided to put a 27 000t 
upper limit on the amount of halibut caught in the high seas in the North West Atlantic (European 
Commission, 1995). The harvests had previously amounted to 40 000t and commitment to lower 
harvest was needed in order to conserve the fish stock. Once the upper limit was fixed, discussions 
began on how to share the quotas. The establishment of these shares then became an international 
issue, mainly concerning disagreement between the EU and Canada, since shares were drastically 
changed compared to how much was harvested before. In the model proposed in this thesis, no 
upper limit of the harvest is set, as was done by NAFO. However, adjustments could easily be made 
in order to replicate the procedure where the quotas were set for the halibut population in the 
North-West Atlantic. This would require a stage of the game where the total limit is set, either 
exogenously or according to given time preferences of countries involved. 
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Another cooperation between countries is the harvest agreement between Norway and Russia 
(Hanneson, 2007). Together the countries manage the cod stock in the Northeast Arctic. After setting 
aside a small share to third countries, harvests are split equally between Norwegian and Russian 
vessels. The total amount is then set each year. The procedure in this thesis is similar, but once 
reporting of the time preferences are made, the model determines shares and total harvests 
instantly. The agreement between Norway and Russia also suffer from quotas being cheated 
(Hanneson, 2007). Russia has likely been overfishing their quotas for several years, and this is a 
potential problem for every establishment of limits on how much to harvest. The problems with 
common fish pools are thus multiple and the management is a complex issue. Overfishing the quotas 
can, however, be avoided by extensive monitoring. In the North-west Atlantic, Canadian authorities 
occasionally inspected vessels as often as twice a week, drastically increasing the risk of being caught 
overfishing the quotas (European Commission, 1995). Cheating and monitoring would be an 
interesting aspect to include in the model. Monitoring comes with a cost, but a certain level would be 
required in order for everyone not to overfish and to keep the fish stock at sustainable levels. 
The analysis of the problems associated with the misreport of time preferences is not only applicable 
to the cooperation in the management of a common fish pool. The analysis can in fact very well 
extend to the management of other resources characterized by a different level of renewability and 
more in general to the provision of public goods and services. 
A sound example is given by the coordination for climate action. When discussing the cutting of 
Greenhouse gas emissions, each interested country desires a lower amount of total emissions. In 
order to reach this target, each country is supposed to contribute by lowering its own emissions. 
However, this action is costly and requires effort over several years. Hence, in the presence of 
incentives for hiding preferences, finding a solution to the standard free riding problem becomes 
even more challenging. 
In conclusion, the impact of misreporting time preferences can, sadly, be a much wider issue 
affecting not only the management of fish stocks. Management of common fish pools can, however, 
serve as an effective representation of the issue, which once again, may emerge within any context 
where the set-up of a coalition may secure welfare improvements.  
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Appendix 
Appendix 1. Second derivative of gains from misreporting 
The second derivative of the gains from misreporting for player 1 with respect to the misreported 
level, when minimizing the weight for player 1, is: 
 
𝛿2𝜋𝑚
𝛿𝛽1
𝑚2
= −
𝛾1
2 (−𝛽2
2 + 2𝛽2(𝛾1𝛽1 − 𝛾1
𝑚 𝛽1
𝑚 + 𝛽1) − 𝛾1
2𝛽1
𝑚2(𝛾1 + 1)𝛽1(2𝛾1𝛽1
𝑚 + 𝛾1 + 1))
(𝛽2 + 𝛾1𝛽1
𝑚)2(𝛽2 + 𝛾1𝛽1
𝑚 + 𝛾1 + 1)2
 
(A.1) 
 
Appendix 2. The optimally proposed weight 
 
Player 2 proposes the weight that makes player 1 indifferent between cooperation and competition. 
This gives: 
 𝑉1
𝐶(𝛾𝑚, 𝛿𝑚) = 𝑉1
𝑁(𝛿𝑖
𝑚) ( A.2 ) 
𝐴1
𝐶(𝛾𝑚, 𝛿𝑚) + (1 + 𝛽1
𝑚) log 𝑠 = 𝐴1
𝑁(𝛿𝑚) + (1 + 𝛽1
𝑚) log 𝑠 
𝐴1
𝐶(𝛾𝑚, 𝛿𝑚) = 𝐴1
𝑁( 𝛿𝑚) 
(1 − 𝛿𝑚)−1(𝑙𝑜𝑔 ℎ1
𝐶𝑚 + 𝛽1
𝑚 log 𝑞𝐶𝑚) = (1 − 𝛿𝑖
𝑚
)
−1
(𝑙𝑜𝑔ℎ1
𝑁𝑚 + 𝛽1
𝑚 log 𝑞𝑁𝑚) 
(𝑙𝑜𝑔 ℎ1
𝐶𝑚 + 𝛽1
𝑚 log 𝑞𝐶𝑚) = (𝑙𝑜𝑔ℎ1
𝑁𝑚 + 𝛽1
𝑚 log 𝑞𝑁𝑚) 
ℎ1
𝐶𝑚
ℎ1
𝑁𝑚 = (
𝑞𝑁𝑚
𝑞𝐶𝑚
)
𝛽1
𝑚
 
(
 
 𝛾1
𝑚
(𝛾1𝑚 + 1)
1
(𝛾1𝑚𝛽1
𝑚 + 𝛽2)
(𝛾1𝑚 + 1)
+ 1
)
 
 
ℎ1
𝑁𝑚⁄ =
(
 
 
𝑞𝑁𝑚
(𝛾1
𝑚𝛽
1
𝑚 + 𝛽2)
(𝛾1𝑚 + 1)
(𝛾1𝑚𝛽1
𝑚 + 𝛽2)
(𝛾1𝑚 + 1)
+ 1
⁄
)
 
 
𝛽1
𝑚
 
𝛾1
𝑚
ℎ1
𝑁𝑚(𝛾1𝑚𝛽1
𝑚 + 𝛽2 + 𝛾1𝑚 + 1)
= (𝑞𝑁𝑚 +
𝑞𝑁𝑚(𝛾1
𝑚 + 1)
(𝛾1𝑚𝛽1
𝑚 + 𝛽2)
)
𝛽1
𝑚
 
And the optimally proposed weight is then: 
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𝛾1
𝑚 = (𝑞𝑁𝑚 +
𝑞𝑁𝑚(𝛾1
𝑚 + 1)
(𝛾1𝑚𝛽1
𝑚 + 𝛽2)
)
𝛽1
𝑚
ℎ1
𝑁𝑚(𝛾1
𝑚𝛽
1
𝑚 + 𝛽2 + 𝛾1
𝑚 + 1) 
( A.2.1 ) 
 
Appendix 3. Deriving an optimal report 
 
The derivative of the gains from misreporting with respect to 𝛽1
𝑚 is: 
 
𝛿𝜋𝑚
𝛿𝛽1
𝑚 = (1 − 𝛿)
−1 [(−
𝛾1
𝑚
(𝛾1𝑚 + 1 + 𝛽2 + 𝛾1𝑚 𝛽1
𝑚)
+
(1 + 𝛽2)
𝛾1𝑚(𝛾1𝑚 + 1 + 𝛽2 + 𝛾1𝑚𝛽1
𝑚)
𝛿𝛾1
𝑚
𝛿𝛽1
𝑚)
+ 𝛽1 (
𝛾1
𝑚2 + 𝛾1
𝑚
(𝛾1𝑚 𝛽1
𝑚 + 𝛽2)(𝛾1𝑚 + 1 + 𝛽2 + 𝛾1𝑚 𝛽1
𝑚)
+
𝛽1
𝑚 − 𝛽2
(𝛾1𝑚 𝛽1
𝑚 + 𝛽2)(𝛾1𝑚 + 1 + 𝛽2 + 𝛾1𝑚 𝛽1
𝑚)
𝛿𝛾1
𝑚
𝛿𝛽1
𝑚)] 
Optimizing gives: 
−𝛾1
𝑚 +
(1 + 𝛽2)
𝛾1𝑚
𝛿𝛾1
𝑚
𝛿𝛽1
𝑚 + 𝛽1 (
𝛾1
𝑚2 + 𝛾1
𝑚
(𝛾1𝑚 𝛽1
𝑚 + 𝛽2)
+
𝛽1
𝑚 − 𝛽2
(𝛾1𝑚 𝛽1
𝑚 + 𝛽2)
𝛿𝛾1
𝑚
𝛿𝛽1
𝑚) = 0 
𝛽1 (
𝛾1
𝑚2 + 𝛾1
𝑚
(𝛾1𝑚 𝛽1
𝑚 + 𝛽2)
+
𝛽1
𝑚 − 𝛽2
(𝛾1𝑚 𝛽1
𝑚 + 𝛽2)
𝛿𝛾1
𝑚
𝛿𝛽1
𝑚) = 𝛾1
𝑚 −
(1 + 𝛽2)
𝛾1𝑚
𝛿𝛾1
𝑚
𝛿𝛽1
𝑚 
𝛾1
𝑚2 + 𝛾1
𝑚
+ 𝛽1
𝑚 𝛿𝛾1
𝑚
𝛿𝛽1
𝑚 − 𝛽2
𝛿𝛾1
𝑚
𝛿𝛽1
𝑚 = (𝛾1
𝑚 −
(1 + 𝛽2)
𝛾1𝑚
𝛿𝛾1
𝑚
𝛿𝛽1
𝑚)(
(𝛾1
𝑚 𝛽1
𝑚 + 𝛽2)
𝛽1
) 
𝛽1
𝑚 𝛿𝛾1
𝑚
𝛿𝛽1
𝑚 = (𝛾1
𝑚 −
(1 + 𝛽2)
𝛾1𝑚
𝛿𝛾1
𝑚
𝛿𝛽1
𝑚)(
(𝛾1
𝑚 𝛽1
𝑚 + 𝛽2)
𝛽1
) + 𝛽2
𝛿𝛾1
𝑚
𝛿𝛽1
𝑚 − 𝛾1
𝑚2 − 𝛾1
𝑚
 
𝛽1
𝑚 𝛿𝛾1
𝑚
𝛿𝛽1
𝑚 − 𝛽1
𝑚 (𝛾1
𝑚 −
(1 + 𝛽2)
𝛾1𝑚
𝛿𝛾1
𝑚
𝛿𝛽1
𝑚)
𝛾1
𝑚 
𝛽1
=
𝛽2
𝛽1
(𝛾1
𝑚 −
(1 + 𝛽2)
𝛾1𝑚
𝛿𝛾1
𝑚
𝛿𝛽1
𝑚) + 𝛽2
𝛿𝛾1
𝑚
𝛿𝛽1
𝑚 − 𝛾1
𝑚2 − 𝛾1
𝑚
 
𝛽1
𝑚 =
𝛽2
𝛽1
(𝛾1
𝑚 −
(1 + 𝛽2)
𝛾1𝑚
𝛿𝛾1
𝑚
𝛿𝛽1
𝑚) + 𝛽2
𝛿𝛾1
𝑚
𝛿𝛽1
𝑚 − 𝛾1
𝑚2 − 𝛾1
𝑚
𝛿𝛾1𝑚
𝛿𝛽1
𝑚 (1 − (𝛾1𝑚 −
(1 + 𝛽2) 
𝛽1
))
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𝛽1
𝑚 =
𝛽2
𝛽1
(
𝛾1
𝑚
𝛿𝛾1𝑚
𝛿𝛽1
𝑚
−
(1 + 𝛽2)
𝛾1𝑚
)+ 𝛽2 −
(𝛾1
𝑚2 − 𝛾1
𝑚
)
𝛿𝛾1𝑚
𝛿𝛽1
𝑚
(1 − 𝛾1𝑚 +
(1 + 𝛽2) 
𝛽1
)
 
This is the optimally reported 𝛽1
𝑚. 
𝛿𝛾1
𝑚
𝛿𝛽1
𝑚 is negative and depends on how the weights are decided, 
which is given by equations (A.2.1) and (A.4.1). 
Appendix 4. The optimal weight in a Nash bargaining scenario 
 
The objective function to be maximized by a collusion deciding weight according to the Nash 
bargaining procedure is: 
 𝑀𝑎𝑥𝛾  𝛱
𝐶𝑚 = [𝑉1
𝐶(𝛾𝑚, 𝛿𝑚) − 𝑉1
𝑁(𝛿𝑖
𝑚)][𝑉2
𝐶(𝛾𝑚, 𝛿𝑚) − 𝑉2
𝑁( 𝛿𝑖
𝑚)] ( A.4 ) 
= [𝐴1
𝐶(𝛾𝑚, 𝛿𝑚) − 𝐴1
𝑁( 𝛿𝑚)][𝐴2
𝐶(𝛾𝑚, 𝛿𝑚) − 𝐴2
𝑁( 𝛿𝑚)] 
= [(1 − 𝛿1
𝑚)−1(𝑙𝑜𝑔 ℎ1
𝐶𝑚 + 𝛽1
𝑚 log 𝑞𝐶𝑚)
− (1 − 𝛿1
𝑚)−1(𝑙𝑜𝑔 ℎ1
𝑁𝑚 + 𝛽1
𝑚 log 𝑞𝑁𝑚)][(1 − 𝛿2
𝑚)−1(𝑙𝑜𝑔 ℎ2
𝐶𝑚 + 𝛽2
𝑚 log 𝑞𝐶𝑚)
− (1 − 𝛿2
𝑚)−1(𝑙𝑜𝑔 ℎ2
𝑁𝑚 + 𝛽2
𝑚 log 𝑞𝑁𝑚)] 
Optimizing, with respect to 𝛾1gives: 
 𝛿𝜋𝐶𝑚
𝛿𝛾1𝑚
= 0
=
𝛿 𝑙𝑜𝑔 ℎ1
𝐶𝑚
𝛿𝛾1𝑚
[(1 − 𝛿2
𝑚)−1(𝑙𝑜𝑔 ℎ2
𝐶𝑚 + 𝛽
2
𝑚 log 𝑞𝐶𝑚) − (1 − 𝛿2
𝑚)−1(𝑙𝑜𝑔 ℎ2
𝑁𝑚 + 𝛽
2
𝑚 log 𝑞𝑁𝑚)]
1 − 𝛿1
𝑚
+
𝛿 𝑙𝑜𝑔 ℎ2
𝐶𝑚
𝛿𝛾1𝑚
[(1 − 𝛿1
𝑚)−1(𝑙𝑜𝑔 ℎ1
𝐶𝑚 + 𝛽
1
𝑚 log 𝑞𝐶𝑚) − (1 − 𝛿1
𝑚)−1(𝑙𝑜𝑔 ℎ1
𝑁𝑚 + 𝛽
1
𝑚 log 𝑞𝑁𝑚)]
1 − 𝛿2
𝑚
+
𝛿 log 𝑞𝐶𝑚
𝛿𝛾1𝑚
𝛽
1
[(1 − 𝛿2
𝑚)−1(𝑙𝑜𝑔ℎ2
𝐶𝑚 + 𝛽
2
𝑚 log 𝑞𝐶𝑚) − (1 − 𝛿2
𝑚)−1(𝑙𝑜𝑔 ℎ2
𝑁𝑚 + 𝛽
2
𝑚 log 𝑞𝑁𝑚)]
1 − 𝛿1
𝑚
+
𝛿 log 𝑞𝐶𝑚
𝛿𝛾1𝑚
𝛽
1
𝑚[(1 − 𝛿1
𝑚)−1(𝑙𝑜𝑔ℎ1
𝐶𝑚 + 𝛽
1
𝑚 log 𝑞𝐶𝑚) − (1 − 𝛿1
𝑚)−1(𝑙𝑜𝑔 ℎ1
𝑁𝑚 + 𝛽
1
𝑚 log 𝑞𝑁𝑚)]
1 − 𝛿2
𝑚  
(A.4.1) 
where 
𝛿 𝑙𝑜𝑔 ℎ1
𝐶𝑚
𝛿𝛾1𝑚
=
𝛽2
𝑚 + 1
𝛾1𝑚(𝛽1
𝑚𝛾1𝑚 + 𝛽2
𝑚 + 𝛾1𝑚 + 1)
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𝛿 𝑙𝑜𝑔 ℎ2
𝐶𝑚
𝛿𝛾1𝑚
= −
𝛽1
𝑚 + 1
𝛽1
𝑚𝛾1𝑚 + 𝛽2
𝑚 + 𝛾1𝑚 + 1
 
𝛿 log 𝑞𝐶𝑚
𝛿𝛾1𝑚
=
𝛽1
𝑚 − 𝛽2
𝑚
(𝛽1
𝑚𝛾1𝑚 + 𝛽2
𝑚)(𝛽1
𝑚𝛾1𝑚 + 𝛽2
𝑚 + 𝛾1𝑚 + 1)
 
 
 
Appendix 5. Illustration of gains from misreporting 
 
 
Figure A1, Gains from misreported levels of the discount factor. (Nash bargaining,  𝜹𝟏=0.99, 𝜹𝟐=0.8) 
 
  
Figure A2, Gains from misreported levels of the discount factor. (Player 2 deciding weights,  d1=0.99 , d2=0.8)  
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